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The Bulgarian political elite in the period of transition 




The main objective of the research of the political elites in Bulgaria is to analyze the 
processes of genesis and regeneration of the political elites since the change of the political 
system in the 90-ies of the twentieth century. The relevance of the topic is largely determined 
by the very characteristics of the object of the research itself - the political elite. An elite is a 
dynamic community that almost continually undergoes changes in its structure, especially in 
periods of transition from one political system to another. The structure and role of the 
political elite in Bulgaria during the period under consideration suffer considerable changes, 
the majority of which cause a qualitative change in both the managerial potential of the elite 
and the public attitude towards its role. The elite has been changing much faster than the 
societies in the two countries and the analysis of the processes proves it. Another reason for 
the relevance of the topic is the fact that the Bulgarian political elite has not been included in 
any comparative studies of the political elites worldwide. In that line of thought, this 
comparative study will be the first of its kind and a serious contribution to political science. 
The main research objectives are as follows: 
- to classify the forms of genesis and transformation of the political elite; 
- to analyze the role of the elites in the process of consolidation after the political 
transformations and the changes in the economic system; 
- to analyze the process of emergence of bureaucratic elites and their role in making 
managerial decisions; 
Methodologically this study uses several basic methods: the method of reconstruction of the 
events and processes of the period; the analytical method, which makes possible the 
identification of coincidences and contradictions during the examined period, as well as the 
establishment of the cause - effect relation between different events and their effect on the 
elite. The research will also make use of empirical data, statistical information, a secondary 
analysis of the survey results, etc. 
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Expected scientific results: 
- systematic presentation of the main authors, approaches and  publications in the researches 
on the political elite in Bulgaria; 
- classification and analysis of the forms of genesis and transformation of the elites in the 
context of the  processes of the transition period and the relations between the two elites; 
- analysis of the role of the elites in the process of decision making; 
- verification of the  hypotheses about "temporal elite" – an elite dependent on the 
surrounding conditions;The specifics of this study necessitate several methodological caveats 
regarding the relation between ‘political elite’ and ‘democracy.’ Firstly, the composition of the 
elite directly impacts the quality of democracy in Bulgaria. In theory, a political elite should 
be construed as a superstructure, an assembly which essentially sublimates the representation 
of various interests and groups. In Bulgarian practice, however, the elite is a substructure, the 
most organized part of society, openly aspiring for control over state governance, and the 
theoretical rationale yields to the ambition of the elite to arrange the political and public space 
according to its needs and expectations. This engenders the difficulties in the relationship 
between elite and non-elite: the elite creates its own periphery, circles and lobbies, which are 
strictly goal-oriented, while that part of the non-elite which remains outside them is left with 
the impression of having no representation. State governance becomes permanently alienated 
from its legitimate grounds, from citizens’ interests1. This imbalance naturally leads to a 
confrontation between the two groups, to the necessity for populist decisions, to difficulties in 
achieving a critical mass for governance consensus different from the one needed for the use 
of power and the division of zones of influence. Secondly, an elite is an emanation of power; 
it cannot exist without power. The empowerment of an elite through the mechanism of 
elections legitimizes the elite as the holder of power; elections are precisely what makes the 
elite an elite, and power, governance. In this sense, ‘each examination of elites starts from the 
premise of power, whether articulated or not’ (Кръстева, 1996). Thirdly, in a situation of 
transformation of the political system, the elite provides the basis for the choice of the type of 
state governance and its implementation, and consequently bears full responsibility for the 
efficiency of the democratic regime, its stability, and compliance with the rules of society. 
Elites that take part in the establishment of the constitutional treaty and new institutions 
introduce such procedural mechanisms that would protect their political power and autonomy 
from any interference by the locus of power (Kaminski, Kurczewska 1995). 
                                                 
1
 Charter for the Dissolution of the Plutocratic Model of the Bulgarian State: www.harta2013.eu (Dec 2013) 
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The concept of ‘elite’ on the following pages should be interpreted within the paradigm of 
functionalism, as ‘citizens who, via elections, come to hold a legally regulated office in the 
governance of the state, and consequently acquire institutional power in the determination and 
implementation of state policies.’ Whenever we consider elites, we must also consider the 
questions of their recruitment and legitimization (Маринов 2004). In this context, the quality 
of an elite may be broken down to answering two questions: How does one come to occupy 
an ‘elite’ position? How do elites exercise power? The first question basically also addresses 
the matter of ‘how does an elite arise?’, i.e. it necessitates an analysis of elite recruitment. The 
second questions pertains to the responsibilities of an elite, to its strategies and the effects of 
their implementation on governance and on society as a whole. Through the implementation 
of these strategies, an elite acts as an intermediary between the institutionalized mechanisms 
of governance and the political expectations of the public. Without analysing the role of 
political elites in political processes, it will be hard, if not impossible, to gain an insight into 
the development trends of a country, whether we examine its contemporary state structure and 
governance, its historical and political evolution, or the actual practical production of policies. 
 
Studies of Bulgarian political elite 
The collapse of communist regimes in 1989 provided a considerable but relatively brief 
impetus to the studies of political elites; some of them included the Bulgarian elite, although 
infrequently (Szelenyi, Treiman 1993), (Bozoki 2002). As a rule, Central and Eastern 
European studies have focused on elites in terms of their role in the processes of changing the 
political system (Bozoki 2003). Consensus between elites regarding the rules of politics and 
the values of democratic institutions is perceived to be crucial for the stability and indeed 
survival of democratic regimes (Best, Cotta 2000). Examining intra-elite relations has resulted 
in the proposition (Higley, Gunter 1991) that at the beginning of the transition, it was 
important for elites to agree on the major evolutionary directions of democracy; this in turn 
determines the importance of formal and informal relations between elites, which contribute 
to the emergence of specific trust. A consensus-oriented elite is the most important 
prerequisite for the attainment and maintenance of a lasting stability for a given socio-political 
system, which also stems from the opportunities of representative of various interest groups to 
access the decision-making process as well as the openness of elites to any new conflicts. 
Consensual unity derives from adherence to common principles and rules, within the 
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framework of accepting the rule of law and the role of institutions in the state. The 
demarcation line between consolidated and non-consolidated democracies coincides with that 
of consensual unity of elites, hence there is a relation between the stability of a regime and the 
structure of an elite. Most unstable countries are dominated by disunited elites, which are in 
conflict with one another, reaching as far as one elite denying the right of the others to exist. 
Such structuring of elites often occurs in societies that are in the process of transition from a 
totalitarian to a democratic system, including the Bulgarian one. The lack of unity and 
consensus about the development trajectories of the state is a major feature of the Bulgarian 
political elite. 
The first attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the Bulgarian political elite on these terms 
belongs to Petya Kabakchieva and Duhomir Minev (Кабакчиева, Минев 1995), who 
regarded political elites in the context of transformation towards democracy and focused on 
their strategies to maintain control over government and society. The role of elites was 
examined within the general framework of the modernization process in Bulgaria: from the 
accumulation of modernization stresses and economic failures during socialism to the 
transformation of the role and status of elites in a society undergoing democratization. The 
authors outlined four strategies employed by the new elite to implement its interests and carry 
out the transformation of political into economic capital. The first one consists of 
strengthening the ties between the elite, ‘the political peak,’ and the (predominantly 
economic) groups related to it, which, during crises, become the major pillars that provide the 
shade for the evolution of grey economy and organized crime. Second, the new elite finds 
stronger support for its power outside Bulgaria than within it; it occupies levels and structures 
isolated from the public and, accordingly, develops its own mode of conduct aimed at winning 
more power and control means. The elite tries to overcome this alienation by populist and 
nationalist discourse as well as by stimulating the bipolar confrontational political model. 
Third, this alienation discourages the elite from pursuing policies ‘in favour of national 
interests,’ and it starts looking for ways to implement its private interests, mostly through 
reintegrating the country into the world economy by exporting capital. ‘ … in effect, the 
struggling East has started financing the struggling West,’ the two authors observed. The 
fourth feature of the elite’s structuring is that it occurs among a lack of authentic political 
parties that could offer different visions about the transition and the evolution of Bulgaria. The 
Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) have employed 
the same strategy: using political power in order to accumulate economic power, which turns 
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them into identical mirrors. Consequently, the concepts of ‘Left’ and ‘Right’ have been based 
primarily on an ideological construction of differences between the two parties, which has led 
to an ideological construction of the transition and of elites. Thus, Left and Right have 
become ‘Bulgarized’; the chief demarcation line between them remains their attitude towards 
the past—anti-communism—rather than the market and the economic role of the state. Such 
strategies have been rendered possible mostly due to the absence of civil society and an 
effective political opposition in Bulgaria. 
Dmitriy Varzonovtsev’s (Варзоновцев 1994) and Evgeniy Daynov and Deyan Kyuranov’s 
(Дайнов, Кюранов 1999) collections include interviews and testimonies by participants in 
the political events from the early 1990s, which helped shape the process of establishing a 
democratic regime. These personal recollections clearly confirmed Kabakchieva and Minev’s 
propositions about the structuring of the political elite, including its behavioural patterns, 
manner of discussing, perceiving and explaining the events from that period
2
. The interviews 
and stories of the political elite demonstrated one thing mostly: that recollections of events 
differ, including events attended by several interviewees. There are a few major elements 
present in the accounts of all representatives of the  political elite. One, demythologization of 
the past before the 1989 changes; two, mythologization of the present, after the changes; 
three, mythologization of one’s personal participation or perspective on the events from the 
transition period. It is worth noting that a common account for the introduction of a particular 
person into the elite ran like this: “we were drinking together and discussing who would 
handle best this or that, and then someone proposed Mr...” 
Andrey Raychev and Kancho Stoychev (Райчев, Стойчев 2004) offered their own 
interpretation of the theories about the ‘second network’ in totalitarian societies and its 
inheritance by the young democracies, regarding it as a major source of power potential for 
the new elites. The authors voiced their doubts about the extent to which the transition 
occurred in the most socially beneficial manner, given the active and deliberate policy of 
transforming the old totalitarian elite into a new economic and thus political elite. 
                                                 
2
 ‘We must have been the worst possible amateurs taking part in elections …. Secondly, a great part of the people 
who stood as candidates were, to put it mildly, politically ignorant. To say nothing of some leaders’ purely 
partisan pushes to have their candidates selected at any cost. These were election slates based on party quotas, 
and some of them had major blunders. There were people, especially in the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s Union, 
who were just good for nothing. They were old, obtuse, and so on.’ (Edvin Sugarev) Varzonovtsev, D., 
Автобиография на българския преход [An Autobiography of the Bulgarian Transition], Sofia, 2005. 
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Alexander Marinov analysed elites also in the context of the transition from totalitarianism to 
democracy (Маринов 2004). According to him, the key factor that renders a democratization 
process successful is the presence of elites alternative to the old ones and capable of 
generating power that unites civil interests, thereby becoming a counterbalance to the non-
democratic loci of power. The lack of such alternative elites enjoying solid public support and 
grass roots as well as the enforced appointment of soft, compromising leaders aggravate the 
transition process. 
The main topics of researching and analysing Bulgarian political elites for which there is a 
research consensus pertain to their transformation and development in the early transition 
years, non-public arrangements during the democratization process (Коларова, 1997), the 
heavy dependence of the process on certain structures and the absence of alternative elites 
(Маринов, 2007), the lack of public traditions and support, and the broken or awkward 
communication between the elite and the public (Манлихерова, 2007). 
The only empirical survey of the Bulgarian social elite is The Elite and Changes in Bulgaria, 
conducted by Vitosha Research in March 1997
3
. Although not restricted to representatives of 
the political elite, the survey drew a clear picture of the elite’s attitudes towards public 
governance, the direction and expectations of the evolution of Bulgaria. The personality traits 
of the surveyed group presented an emphatically meritocratic profile: ‘representatives of the 
Bulgarian elite are self-confident and certain that they are competent enough to achieve the 
goals they strive for; they have the sense they live and work for the sake of something 
important; they love intellectual challenges and solving complex problems; they enjoy 
undertaking risks that could bring profit; they have the mentality of entrepreneurs rather than 
employees; they prefer to work for themselves and accept all ensuing liability; for roughly 
three fourths of them, personal happiness is primarily related to professional success; the 
majority of the interviewed representatives of Bulgarian elite act as individualists. They 
believe that the responsibility for personal prosperity lies with the individual rather than the 
state.’ In terms of demographic characteristics, 90% of the elite representatives are university 
graduates, and about 15% hold more than one degree; 84% can speak or understand Russian, 
about 50% , English, and about 30%, German or French; nearly 80% are men. In other words, 
                                                 
3
 It consisted of 421 personal interviews with representatives of Stefan Sofiyanski’s government, the state 
administration, public and private businesses, the army, the media, intellectuals and religious leaders. 
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the group’s characteristics surpass the average ones for Bulgaria, which confirms its 
meritocratic profile. 
As a whole, the survey reveals the lack of a common vision for the evolution of Bulgaria; a 
large part of the respondents’ answers contradict one another, e.g. by offering a combination 
of egalitarian attitudes and expectations of a liberal market economy. A major part of the 
interviewees believe that common Bulgarians do not receive a fair share of the nation’s 
wealth, and accept state control as necessary, i.e. express markedly leftist views. However, 
their views on economy are surprisingly rightist, with 60 to 70% in favour. The lack of a 
shared vision about the future is also evident in the almost equal percentages supporting or 
opposing Bulgaria’s accession to NATO; there is a similar ratio in the evaluations of the 
collapse of the USSR. 40% of the representatives of the Bulgarian elite claim that people are 
not yet mature enough for the democratic changes, therefore political liberties should be 
introduced gradually. 60% believe that in that particular moment Bulgaria needed a strong 
leader to bring order in the country: a rather odd view for people defined as representatives of 
the elite. On the one hand, it demonstrates the expectation of the ‘strong hand’ typical of the 
transitional years; on the other, it is an implicit confession that the elite cannot cope with the 
governance of Bulgaria through its available resources and abilities. 
Empirical data from the series of surveys conducted under the ‘Quality of Democracy in 
Bulgaria’ project as well as analysing data from other studies show a relatively stable attitude 
towards the political elite. A particularly striking feature is the explicit distancing from the 
political elite: the question ‘Do you have a relative, friend, personal acquaintance whom you 
consider to be part of the political elite, of famous politicians?’ yielded only 16% positive 
responses, of which 13% said, ‘yes, but they’re not a close friend.’ A demographic cross-
section of positive respondents reveals them to have higher or secondary education and to 
work most often as government officials in large cities. 
The major expectations of the elite continue to be meritocratic: criteria for a successful 
political career include ‘proper education and professional experience’ (23%), ‘wits, 
knowledge and intelligence’ (23.6%). This is reinforced by responses to the question ‘Do you 
think it’s possible for a common worker, salesperson, driver or another person with an 
ordinary profession to become a successful politician in Bulgaria?’; 65% of them are 
negative. Positive responses here come primarily from retired or low-income people, which 
can be easily explained with attitudes developed in another socio-political environment. Other 
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desirable qualities in a politician include ‘a good person who takes care of the others’ (16.5%) 
and ‘a resolute person, capable of imposing his or her opinion’ (11.8%). The expectations ‘a 
common person, who understands common people’ and ‘someone who has business 
experience or even wealth’ gathered 9.8% and 9.6% respectively. Respondents could select up 
to 3 answers. The perception that a strong hand is the best governance option (displaced by 
the ‘good king’ in that moment) was solidly supported by about 10% of the respondents. 
Other dominant notions held that the most suitable politicians are economists (62%) and 
lawyers (51%). 
 
The elite change 
Politics is an open system. Any adult citizen can engage in it, form a view about it, or take 
part in various political activities. On the other hand, politics is a projection of the processes 
happening in society itself: political, economic, ethnic, social, etc. Due to its specific role as a 
regulator of social processes, politics often becomes a battlefield of conflicts, of struggle 
between the interests of various social, professional, business, ethnic, etc. groups. And since it 
is an open system, these groups contend and strive to push and protect their interests in all 
possible ways, including non-public means, lobbying, pressure, etc. Conflict is a fundamental 
feature of politics, hence of elites; in this sense, the recruitment of political elites directly 
influences the stability and qualities of conflict (Putnam 1976). The presence of explicit rules 
for recruiting an elite provides a mode for reducing the conflict potential of politics, of 
filtering those whose views do not reflect social consensus and the inter-elite consensus 
regarding governance. This makes elites considerably more viable and resilient to changes in 
society and politics. In most political systems, the selection of party and government elites 
puts an emphasis on administrative experience and personal qualities, such as popularity and 
the ability to communicate, persuade and organize large groups of people. 
However, the profile of representatives of the Bulgarian political elite and a great number of 
events from Bulgaria’s most recent history have indicated a lack of clear recruitment 
principles. This has created a major potential for instability of state governance and the 
administration, and the manners of entering/presence in/departure from the Bulgarian political 
elite have frequently resembled a process of bartering and haggling rather than selection. 
Bulgarian political practice has witnessed a number of techniques for elite recruitment: career 
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growth through party or state structures; taking a candidate slot on a slate, including by 
paying for it; favouritism or family, work or other personal ties; transfer from a key position 
in another field—business, science, defence, etc.—to politics. However, occupying an elite 
position becomes legitimate only after passing the procedure of elections, whose general 
accessibility and public character make them the main mechanism for the formal recruitment 
of political elites. Elections publicly legitimize the right of a group of people to rule another 
one, usually much larger, and in this sense, the process of (de)legitimization of political elites 
through elections and the unconditional acceptance of the results by their opponents are 
among the crucial features of democracy. Each electoral cycle, regardless of its type, brings 
about changes in the composition of the elite: the entrance of new actors and the exit of old 
ones. It is through the procedure of elections that people evaluate the actions of their elite, 
through their subjective perceptions; this evaluation may not always coincide with the self-
assessment and expectations of the elite. 
Elections are the procedure that empowers particular citizens and turns them into an elite, but 
electoral results seldom match voters’ expectations of the qualities of the elected candidates 
(Dahl 1958, 1961)
4
. The parliamentary democracy system presupposes that people are chosen 
(i.e. become an elite) through democratic means (i.e. elections), after satisfying certain 
prerequisites. And since these prerequisites are formal
5 rather than related to candidates’ 
personalities, any meritocratic expectations that the elected candidates will be highly 
educated, highly moral, highly qualified, etc. people, corresponding to the image of an elite, 
can be nothing but illusions. It is these subjective notions of an elite and the discrepancy 
                                                 
4 ‘... In order to know whether there exists a ruling elite or not, we must have a political system in which there 
are occasional divergences in the preferences of the individuals populating it.’ 
5
 Election Code, Art. 4. (1) The right to be elected National Representative shall vest in any Bulgarian citizens 
who have attained the age of 21 years by polling day, do not hold another citizenship, are not interdicted and do 
not serve a custodial sentence. 
(2) Eligibility for President and Vice President of the Republic shall be limited to natural-born Bulgarian citizens 
who have attained the age of 40 years, who does not hold another citizenship, is not interdicted, does not serve a 
custodial sentence, and has resided in Bulgaria during the last five years. 
(3) The right to be elected Member of the European Parliament for the Republic of Bulgaria shall vest in any 
Bulgarian citizen who has attained the age of 21 years by polling day, does not hold the citizenship of any State 
which is not a Member State of the European Union, is not interdicted, does not serve a custodial sentence, has a 
permanent address in the Republic of Bulgaria, and has resided in the Republic of Bulgaria of in another 
Member State of the European Union at least during the last six months. 
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between them and the objective political reality that underlie statements such as ‘this elite is 
no elite’ or ‘there is no elite.’ 
The model of operation of the Bulgarian political system provides for two ways to accomplish 
this empowerment or legitimization: through a direct or indirect election. Thus, in terms of 
formal legitimization, the Bulgarian political elite comprises two types of representatives: 
elected by a direct vote (President, Vice-President, Members of Parliament, Members of the 
European Parliament) or elected indirectly, by a vote in Parliament (Government). 
Due to the importance of the election mechanism, elites have strived to secure their influence 
and control over both the election procedure and voters’ decision-making process. The 
Bulgarian electoral system provides parties with opportunities for an almost complete control 
over these key elements, with the consequence that the mechanism of elections as a means to 
impact the composition of the elite is often subverted. In the pure proportional system, part of 
the eligible seats are de facto reserved for certain party candidates, regardless of their personal 
qualities. Nomination procedures function ineffectively and often succumb to orchestrated 
and pre-organized campaigns benefiting the candidate who is a favourite for taking up the 
position, whether people like him or not; this yields the paradox that a candidate is not elected 
by citizens or party members but той е избран да бъде избран (Mosley 1982). On the 
national level, such attempts are coupled with changes in electoral law, the type of ballots, the 
areas of constituencies, even in the electoral system itself. An elite obtains legitimacy and 
power by laws
6
, which are practically always amended immediately before elections. That is, 
an elite gets ‘elected’ by rules defined by none other than itself. Thus, there is only a nominal 
legitimization by the electorate, and the act of voting places the electorate in a position of de 
facto relinquishing the option to influence the authorities, because of the specifics of the 
electoral system. Ordered party slates cannot be controlled or rearranged by voters, including 
members and supporters of the respective party. Thus, it turns out that ‘elections don’t change 
anything,’7 or at least they do not change the composition of the elite to a degree that would 
create an impression of renewal or change, if nothing else. In practice, the electorate becomes 
a mere carrier of the ballot to the ballot-box; anything before and after that act is outside of its 
control. 
                                                 
6
 Election Code 
7
 ‘Elections don’t change anything—if they did, they’d be banned.’ A graffiti on Vasil Levski Boulevard in the 
centre of Sofia. 
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A relatively indisputable element in the biography of the Bulgarian democratic political elite 
is the moment of its birth and the manner of its initial legitimization. In general, the new elite 
combined two major groups: the former so-called party (communist) nomenklatura and the 
dissident circles (Пачкова 1996). The setting up of the Round Table, the transitional structure 
between the two regimes, on 3 January 1990 was the début of the new political elite. Of 
course, its composition was questionable and we must bear in mind that its legitimacy, i.e. 
recognition by the electorate, had not yet happened, therefore it would not be entirely correct 
to call the participants in the round table an elite. It would seem more appropriate to call them 
a proto-elite: groups from which the future democratic Bulgarian political elite would be born. 
One of the participating sides in the round table, namely the opposition, de facto represented 
no-one. A group of citizens sitting at the table opposite the current authorities by mutual 
agreement do not in any way become legitimized as politicians or an elite. Some of them were 
indeed dissidents, i.e. people with an attitude towards the authorities; others had been 
politicians before 1947, while still others were fledgling politicians, leaders of newly emerged 
parties, etc.
8
 At the same time, across the table sat representatives of the outgoing, though still 
ruling authorities. Their right to be there was legitimized only by their status (and power) of 
an official state government. It was this mutual legitimization of the right of the groups to join 
the round table that provided the initial recognition of those who would subsequently become 
the ‘new’ Bulgarian political elite and would be ultimately legitimized as such in the Grand 
National Assembly elections. Thus, Bulgarian transition began with an apparent consensus, an 
agreement between the two major proto-elites of democracy: the old communist one and the 
new anti-communist one. This semblance would crumble later on, due to the political 
disagreements between the two groups as well as the incompatibility of their strategies with 
the people who were not represented at the Round Table—afterwards tagged as ‘the 
electorate.’ The fragility of that type of legitimacy was revealed in the subsequent fate of the 
parliamentary elite from the early period. We may illustrate it with the table below: out of 412 
MPs in the Grand National Assembly, only 87 were re-elected in its successor, the 36
th
 
National Assembly. In that respect, BSP and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) 
have been most stable: their parliamentary groups have often (1995, 2005, 2009) remained 
                                                 
8
 ‘Our structures were joined by every Tom, Dick and Harry: people possessed by some sort of revanchism to get 
even with the communists, to ride the wave. With a few exceptions—people whose relatives had been 
persecuted—the local intelligentsia did not join UDF.’ Varzonovtsev, D., Автобиография на българския преход 
[An Autobiography of the Bulgarian Transition], Sofia, 2005. 
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relatively unchanged in composition. The table clearly reveals two instances of major changes 
in the composition of the parliamentary elite, related to the election victory of the catch-all 
party National Movement for Stability and Progress (NMSP) and the wave supporting 
Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB, from the Bulgarian acronym). 
Continuity 
(re-election in two consecutive National Assemblies) 
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14 July 2009 – 15 March 2013 
280 67 
23,9% 
Table 1. Data based on (Стойчев 2010), updated as of 15 March 2013 
A specific case of political elite recruitment occurred before the 2001 parliamentary elections, 
when the largely functioning mechanism for mutual legitimization of the elite was 
undermined by the inclusion of new actors in the political elite, picked by a charismatic leader 
on a subjective principle of the ‘selectorate’ type. This change was set in motion by the 
appearance of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, who, for purely biographic reasons, came with 
royal attributes, very similar to the meritocratic distinction that the electorate makes between 
itself and the political elite. The appearance of a charismatic leader coupled with the notion of 
                                                 
9
 Includes MPs who have held a partial mandate for a particular reason: becoming elected to another position, 
leaving the parliament, death, etc. 
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‘yuppies’ introduced by the Bulgarian Velikden (generally, highly educated Bulgarians who 
had been successful abroad) gradually marked the beginning of a new political elite, which 
replaced the old one: an act that was legitimized also by the results of the parliamentary 
elections. The only functioning mechanisms for entering the ranks of the elite at that time 
were loyalty to Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, personal recommendations, or direct 
favouritism. The leader’s charisma and the gathered momentum did not require a 
‘materialization’ of the picture of the new elite. The new faces were comparatively unknown: 
neither appealing nor repelling, yet ‘recognized’ by the leader. Thus, the means and manners 
for recruiting a political elite were effectively replaced by a single man’s will—a phenomenon 
that would be manifestly repeated in the 2009 elections, when the man in charge was Boyko 
Borisov. 
These major changes in the elite’s composition led to the emergence of stable ‘elite cores’ in 
the traditional parties, which are resilient to changes. The cores have usually formed around 
party leaders and individuals who hold senior positions in the party or represent various 
political or economic interests. They are highly resistant to changes in their composition and 
exert direct control over the political and party elite. The actions of the cores, who strive to 
impose their values and opinions on everyone else, have boosted subjective criteria (loyalty, 
influence, personal qualities) into becoming the most important factor in recruiting the elite, 
as witnessed in the composition of the BSP, MRF, NMSP and Attack parliamentary groups 
after the 2005 and 2009 elections. 
In order to explain the interrelation between the quality of a political elite and the quality of 
democracy, we need to discover the theoretical specificity of its nature, the universal key for 
explaining the subject-object relation; this key is power. Here, by power we mean power over 
the state, the syncretic set of instruments, influence and institutions that ensure actual 
governance. It is the type of power construed by Bertrand Russell as a capability for 
‘producing intended results’ (Иванов 2002), and the state is defined as “ … a field of power 
resembling a playground, where owners of capital of various nature contend for gaining 
power over the state, i.e. power with respect to state capital, providing control over the 
various types of capital and their multiplication” (Bourdieu 1986), i.e. the state is on the one 
hand a physical framework of the space in which elites contend with one another, and on the 
other, a goal, prize for the winners, which would enable them to expand and solidify their 
power. Elites indubitably possess power, and what differentiates them internally is their 
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attitude towards power, interpreted as a complex of intended results, i.e. intentions for its use 
based on their expected effects. The primary reason for this is that power is both a goal and an 
instrument for implementing a particular policy. 
Elites’ monopoly of power always poses a problem in societies that turn to a new model of 
existence and evolution. The use of power in democratic states presupposes rules that govern 
it, but in a situation of transition, of a gradual emergence of such rules, there necessarily arises 
a pressure between those who have power and those who do not accept this fact for various 
reasons. The improper structuring of power—that is, the improper formulation of the 
relationships between individuals (or groups) and those who are in charge of decision-
making—gave birth to the Bulgarian paradox: the continuing existence of an enormous (in 
terms of scope and intentions), yet internally corroded and weak state (Дайнов 1997). In the 
Bulgarian state, the strategic planning of results has been allocated to political parties, 
economic lobbies and non-public groups. The majority of media and non-governmental 
organizations have been ‘conceived in sin,’ i.e. founded in order to cater to certain interests. 
Changing the model of governance, the model of relations between institutions and citizens, 
between state and civil society, between elite and non-elite has been one of the main 
challenges of the transition. In this sense, elites should legitimize their right to exercise power, 
i.e. win and keep the trust of the public. The public itself should discover the mechanisms to 
restrict this power, besides the existing institutional means. In other words, both the elite and 
the public should find the intersections of their attitudes towards power. The search for this 
balance of attitudes towards power between the elite and the public has been an issue for the 
entire transition, and thus the period under consideration. This is reinforced by the warning 
(Schоpflin 1993) that “Democracy requires a package of values, both from the authorities and 
from the electorate, which include self-restriction, compromise, negotiation, mutuality, 
feedback mechanisms and so on. Post-communist countries cannot expect to develop these at 
once: they can only result from many years of practice.” 
The peculiar role of the elite in the processes of changing a political system has been a 
frequent problem in ex-socialist countries as well as other countries undergoing a transition to 
democracy (Dogan, Higley 1998). There is a consensus among researchers about the role of 
the elite in the choice of the new governance type, the democratization of mechanisms, the 
change of rules, the establishment of new institutions, and the stability of democracy. In the 
case of Bulgaria, the main actions of the political elite during the transition years have taken 
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two directions. One: deconstruction of the political system and the rules regulating the 
management of social and economic relations; two: reconstruction of the political reality, but 
with new rules and relations. Consequently, evaluations of the preferred form of governance 
are directly related to the vision of the elite about the necessary changes at the entrance of the 
system and the public expectations at its exit. The elite makes informed choices, usually based 
on clear expectations about the results of its actions. The non-elite, however, evaluates these 
results post factum, after the events, because this is when it is provided with an opportunity 
and information to do so. 
At the beginning of the transition, the strategies of the elite for changing the system appeared 
to have the approval of the public; the necessity for change was evident, and so was the 
general direction it should take. The situation with the transformation of the economy was 
ostensibly the same, but here the elite had the strategic advantage of its position of power, of 
control over rules, which enabled it to transform its power into an economic one, control over 
resources, and thus realize its own private interests rather than the public ones. The political 
elite imposed such social relations that would provide it with control over everyone else 
(Петев 2004). 
This strategy of the elite was particularly obvious during the 1990s, when political parties 
were transformed into ‘parties of power’: they were entirely funded, ‘fed’ their leaders and 
members by being in power. The allocation of government positions, job appointments, 
‘giving away’ business were done, not to benefit governance but for the sake of selfish 
interests. In this case, the elite traded in influence, which only led to the emergence of 
temporary dependences that could be broken by a better offer or a threat from another party. 
The success of this strategy has been the establishment of NMSP and its transition into the 
scheme of the Triple Coalition as well as the deliberate re-orientation of MRF in this direction 
over the past decade. 
In essence, changing the system is also legitimized by elections, given that elected 
representatives are granted a constitutionally guaranteed control over it, and parliamentary 
majorities are a crucial element for the implementation of elite strategies. In this sense, 
controlling the electoral process becomes an essential factor for securing a parliamentary 
majority. This alters the purpose of elections, transforming them into a mere substitution of 
the ruling elite for another that has the same characteristics but differs in its ideological 
discourse about its role in history and economics. The mass public comes to believe that 
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‘elections don’t change anything,’ and their results are reduced to two mathematical quantities 
interpreted as levels of success: the 4% threshold for entering Parliament, and the 50.42%
10
 
threshold for forming a majority in the National Assembly. The extreme abnormality of the 
political situation, electoral process and rules has become especially obvious since 2003. The 
ascent of controlled votes, vote buying, as a major tool of election campaigns, including on 
the polling day itself, has become a point of covert consensus among the elite: the vice is 
countered by the very means that it employs. Elections have become a market phenomenon, 
money being a primary indicator of efficiency (while remaining a scarce commodity for 
certain social groups). In this context, it is now money competing with money, and since all 
election candidates use money, curbing controlled votes has proved difficult. Legislative 
changes focus on consequences, not on causes or prevention, and the ‘umbrellas’ put up by 
the elite (especially local party leaders) over any participants in the process, have effectively 
turned vote buying into a normal practice. 
This change of the rules of political competition has necessitated a substitution of PR 
techniques and activities for political messages. Especially since the 2005 parliamentary 
elections, the emphasis has been, not on policies proposed, but mostly on negative 
campaigning that smears opponents. As a result, the fairness of electoral procedures and 
subsequently of election results themselves has been seriously questioned. The change of the 
electoral process rules was particularly evident in the 2013 elections, which marked a peak in 
resorting to ‘dirty’ methods, and their results were not recognized as genuine for a long time. 
The status change of the purpose of elections—turning them into a political weapon, rather 
than a procedure for the democratic replacement/affirmation of authorities—poses a threat to 
the entire political system and leads to a further encapsulation of the political elite. An 
election victory no longer indicates successful expert messages, policies proposed by a party 
and approved by the electorate, but merely establishing supremacy and shared dirty secrets, 
primarily measured through the funds invested in the elections, often against the law.
11
 
Having legitimized their power in such a manner, elites essentially abandon their role in the 
political structure of society: the genuine representation of voters and their interests. Being in 
power becomes an end in itself, a tool for realizing private interests, occasionally presented as 
public ones. Thus, violating politics’ unwritten rules turns into a recipe for success, even a 
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 This is equivalent to 121 MPs: 50% of the seats plus1. 
11 Изследването за парите в кампаниите Алфа Рисърч 
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prerequisite of success. The internalization of practices (Константинов 1980) primarily 
encountered in election campaigns from the early 20
th
 century results merely in the 
unravelling of the political fabric. Through their conduct, elites gradually lose fundamental 
political and moral reference points, among which we may include the loss of restrictions 
defining formal rhetoric. Vulgarization of politics turns into an attraction, a model to be 
emulated, based on the ‘who will go farther’ principle. The erosion of fundamental ‘rites’ in 
politics and the electoral process, which essentially underlie their institutionalization and 
credibility—equal access, non-violence, non-coercion—directly impacts the quality of 
democracy, as a commonly accepted form of governance. 
This ‘crisification’ of the political model and representation drives elites to use techniques for 
creating parallel realities, pseudo-structures, and degrades the socio-political debate to a 
search for solutions to mundane problems. It also necessitates orienting the public image of 
state governance towards populist actions, towards conflict-based messages and publicity. 
Parliamentary democracy has been reduced to procedures and institutions that, given their 
limited functions, may well operate in an authoritarian environment too, without threatening 
to redistribute power mechanisms or the means for economic and media control over society. 
In their endeavour to retain their power and feign a discussion with the public, elites resort to 
simulations of ‘civil society,’ civil organizations, protests and activities. Politicians’ behind-
the-scenes participation in such activities ultimately results in decay of values and confusion 
of society, enabling all sorts of ideas and actors to infiltrate politics, including radical 
excesses, which accounts for the success of such parties as Attack and talking in the language 
of hate in general. 
Another kind of ‘simulating’ politics on behalf of elites and related groups is the engineering 
of parties established or used to carry out ‘wetwork,’12 whose existence and actions further 
aggravate attitudes towards politics and politicians. The first such acts date back to the early 
1990s, when they aimed to accelerate the disintegration of the Bulgarian Agrarian People’s 
Union and the Bulgarian Social Democratic Party and establish their counterfeit doubles. The 
political fate of splinter groups throughout the transition period has unequivocally 
demonstrated that their actions have been instigated by others—now BSP, now UDF; here we 
may also include the ostentatious establishment of the National Movement for Rights and 
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 Such as the Nova Zora party with its video ‘If you vote for Boyko Borisov, you get Ivan Kostov’ during the 
2009 parliamentary elections campaign. 
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Freedoms in 1998 by Gyuner Tahir, an MP from UDF. Party mimicries lead to the gradual 
collapse of parties but also to the collapse of the idea of an alternative, and even of the 
meaning of words such as ‘order,’ ‘rule of law,’ ‘justice,’ ‘proud,’ ‘leader.’ 
There are analogous methods for controlling the potential emergence of counter-elites: groups 
that may take advantage of the exodus of electors from traditional parties. A demonstration of 
subverting the opportunity for a rational choice is the unique phenomenon ‘a party-nominated 
independent candidate,’ as well as the plethora of ‘civic’ quotas, ‘local parties,’ ‘local 
coalitions,’ ‘fake’ parties, etc. participating in various elections. Here we may also add one-
man parties such as George Ganchev, Krastyo Petkov, Tsvetelin Kanchev, Toma Tomov, etc., 
who occasionally turn the electoral process into a burlesque circus. Their presence in political 
space is usually linked to personal or corporate interests, including local ones, to the selling of 
nominations for local elections, etc. Funding the participation of such political actors in 
elections had never been transparent, nor have their indirect ties to a particular party been 
demonstrable, yet the continuing ‘competition’ of such political metastases for the trust of the 
electorate can only be explained with political engineering by the ruling elites. 
These acts of the elite demonstrate that the established political model relies primarily on 
conflict, with interim instances of consensus that are generally achieved through bartering, 
including at the price of contradictory compromises. The helplessness of the elite is evident in 
the struggle of some of its members to present themselves as anti-elite: from ‘I’m one of 
you’13 to the almost biblical ‘you’re simple and I’m simple, so we get each other’14. The 
perseverance to be an oxymoron, ‘ruling non-elite,’ is a natural continuation to the populist 
wave in the elite’s rhetoric, especially prominent since 2000. The same period witnessed the 
emergence of ‘hollow elites,’ life-boats for failed political parties and leaders, which, trough 
non-public funding and agreements, have managed to enter Parliament: Bulgarian Nationalist 
Union, Order, Law and Justice, Attack. Once inside, they fail to handle the responsibilities of 
power, to convince anyone (including themselves) that they are an elite. Their maintenance of 
this status is brief and tragic; they are used as ‘postboxes,’ tools for buying majorities by other 
parties, and the trajectories of their careers logically lead back to their original state or to an 
overt ‘encashment’ of their influence. Such elites usually enter politics claiming that they 
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 A common slogan in local elections (2003, 2007). 
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want to change it, make it ‘closer to people,’ but as a rule, this change gets reduced to an 
attempt to reject traditional characteristics and make politics according to certain personal 
perceptions—with no ideology, no platform, no responsibilities, and with the fundamental 
values of ‘our leader, our party, our folks.’ 
Consequently, Bulgarian society has been afflicted with an obvious imbalance, a constant 
search for an imaginary meritocratic elite, ending in the discovery of a traditional, power-
based one, which is not wanted, yet is the only possible alternative. The intense public 
expectation of a meritocratic elite dominates the relationship between elite and non-elite, and 
the sense that the elite does not govern according to society’s notions of ‘morality’ is a grave 
challenge to the entire political system. It generates perceptions that the elite has strayed from 
certain ethical norms, from its function as a role model, even though the category of 
‘morality’ has no part in politics and cannot be defined in the same explicit manner in which it 
is used in everyday life, primarily since politics is a results-oriented process. The electorate 
cannot accept that morality in politics differs from its own notions; looking for an easy 
answer, electors conclude that ‘they’re all scoundrels,’ and arrive at the paradox of eternal 
return, of setting negative experience as the basis of their model of behavioural reaction 
towards the elite. 
 
The new elite 
Since its emergence at the beginning of the transition, the democratic Bulgarian political elite 
has held its position in political space because it has been in the right place at the right time. 
Consequently, it has dominated this niche only for a particular amount of time—until the 
change of its environment, its nutrient medium. This offers a possible explanatory model for 
the changes in the composition of the elite over the transition period as well as for its 
behaviour as an elite. The heavy dependence on environmental factors, on the political, 
economic and social situation, has made the elite a temporal one, an elite that is influenced by 
the transition processes and the activity of the participants in these processes. This elite cannot 
function efficiently outside the concrete historical and political situation, which largely 
accounts for the major changes in the composition of the elite during the transition period. 
This volatility of the elite has also been predetermined by its weak ties with society and its 
strong dependence on parties and external interests: economic and other lobbies. The urge to 
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maintain such an abnormal situation for as long as possible and thus make it normal has led to 
the emergence of a fixed model of bargaining among and inside elites. This recurring scheme 
is especially evident in the elites of stable parties such as BSP and MRF. There have been no 
abrupt changes in the composition of the elite, even during severe crises such as the one in 
1997, or losing power, as in 2009. The gradual evolutionary succession of generations in these 
parties, including the passing down of positions from parents to children, provides their elites 
with stability. In such cases, elites are conservative, the processes of renewal and recruitment 
are predetermined and control the political environment, party structures and members. In this 
area of political space, changes in the existing political elite are nearly impossible if they are 
not deliberately launched, i.e. they can happen only ‘from above.’ Essentially, everything 
boils down to the prospect of teaching successors, be they family members or protégés, how 
to rule. 
Changes in the political milieu caused by the introduction of the Internet and the means for 
parallel immediate communication among more than two people have had a strong impact on 
the political elite. First of all, they have brought along high publicity and transparency of 
elites’ actions, decisions, often of personal relationships, private property, etc. It was control 
over these aspects that enabled elites to implement plans and strategies primarily in 
accordance with their interests and to their advantage. Publicity, although only ostensible in 
certain situations, has allowed the non-elite to monitor the actions of the elite and verify 
whether the positions of the two coincide or diverge. The virtual environment has ousted 
traditional media from their role as a conduit for ideas, including propaganda, through which 
the elite generally earned its political comfort. It is only in social networks that a harmless 
piece of news can explode into a sensation (becoming ‘viral’), which would otherwise have 
amounted to several lines on the inside pages of a newspaper. This environment allows the 
specific cumulation of the potential of politically active Internet users. The combination of 
virtual and physical reality has boosted the implementation of group political interests, which 
has frequently put political elites in a subordinate position, i.e. they have begun to lose their 
status as decision makers. 
At the same time, this environment of streamlined communication has given birth to a new 
phenomenon that may be called ad hoc elites. Essentially, these are ‘unpersonified’ elites 
(groupness is one of their major features), spontaneously formed and legitimized as 
representing the interests of particular dynamic social groups. This phenomenon has emerged 
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against the backdrop of a generational shift, where the active part of society is highly distinct 
from the ruling elite. Today’s young people are well educated, upper middle income, i.e. they 
have grown up in the situation of transition but have managed to find their place in society, 
earn a particular status, and they have considerable potential for success, both in private and 
in public matters. This generation ties in its personal prospects for success with the existence 
of public regulations; compliance with those regulations is a precondition for success, while 
their absence (or defectiveness) becomes an obstacle to self-fulfilment, which must be 
overcome. 
The new ad hoc political elites are the final product of a succession of events that have 
occurred dynamically and over a relatively brief period and basically represent a process of 
natural selection in a community that does not necessarily aspire to political careers but does 
realize the importance of controlling political processes. These events can be compared to a 
process of legitimization, due to the explicit distinction and acceptance of the role of leaders 
in stating the community objectives and negotiating their implementation. The emergence of a 
new ad hoc elite consists of several stages: a process of accumulating a critical mass of trust, 
which legitimizes, first, the significance of the issue, second, the elite itself, and third, the 
options for resolving the issue delegated to it. First stage: emergence of a systematic 
governance problem, which is noticed by separate, initially unorganized individuals, who 
focus on solving the problem. Second stage: the individuals, independently of one another, 
popularize the problem, propose group actions for resolving it and start attracting supporters, 
using their personal online contacts or other means of communication. Third stage: personal 
contacts lead to: 1. hyper dissemination (the snowball effect): via circles of friends, forum 
discussions, Facebook interest groups, etc.; 2. community: at the intersections of 
dissemination, opinions start gravitating towards a consensus, debates become concentrated 
within particular limits; and 3. trust in the importance of the problem and the need to resolve 
it. Fourth stage: distributed brainstorming. There starts an uncontrolled process of looking for 
possible solutions to the problem. The use of social networks has the advantage of speeding 
up this brainstorming and allowing an unlimited number of participants to join, without the 
necessity to meet in a place outside the virtual environment. Thus, it takes a short time to 
solve problems, discuss situations, generate ideas and messages: results that would be hard to 
happen in parallel and in a brief time-frame under the classical decision-making process. Fifth 
stage: moving on to action. Organizing events and petitions, selecting representatives among 
the most active participants that would be in charge of the organization, including offline 
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activities. Sixth stage: promoting and resolving the problem through putting pressure on 
institutions and public opinion leaders, often combined with an explicit refusal to politicize 
the actions and a dissolution. The rate of response, dissemination and debate in this process 
gives a strategic advantage to these groups over classical types of actions in politics, where 
existing procedures and the hierarchic nature of decision-making slow down reactions. It 
would be a stretch to claim that this ‘elite’ exhibits meritocratic features, yet the natural 
process of filling leading positions by people with outstanding personal abilities hints at a 
similar conclusion. This model can largely account for the ‘revolutions’ that happened in 
recent years in countries and communities without a serious democratic tradition. These ad 
hoc elites essentially look for ways to set right the actions and inactions of the classical 
political elites, which have been hard pressed to represent and fulfil the expectations of 
societies with increased demands on the authorities. The emerging educational, social and 
economic features of various public groups entail expectations of becoming equal in status 
with the elite. This effectively leads to the parallel existence of a closed elite, whose main 
characteristic is the possession of power, and other groups, who have no access to political 




The tradition in recruiting elites that has emerged in the transition years and the manners in 
which they have wielded their power expectedly resulted in outbreaks of civil unrest in 2013. 
It is a tradition where the electoral process goes hand in hand with violations and 
manipulations: controlled votes, vote buying, amendments in electoral law to the advantage of 
those who are in power, abusing public resources during campaigns, etc. Breaches of 
democratic procedures, often tagged as ‘peculiarities of the model’ or ‘transition problems,’ 
have become a routine: fusing of economic and political power, adoption of explicitly lobby-
driven laws, an unstable party system, non-public decision making, high levels of corruption. 
These are phenomena whose systematic recurrence has gradually transformed them from 
abnormal into ordinary and expected events. All of this, combined with the ongoing economic 
crisis and the expanding gap between the rich and the poor, and the privileged status of 
particular people, groups and parties has further escalated tension and stirred unrest, not so 
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much because the elite is incapable of handling the various issues, but because it has been 
preoccupied with solving its own problems and the problems of its affiliated circles and 
groups. 
In this context, democracy, as a form of state governance, has become associated with the 
inability or unwillingness of ruling elites to demonstrate a fair attitude towards the electorate 
and public agenda. This is the main challenge facing Bulgarian democracy: to mitigate the 
potential for a future confrontation between those citizens who are most active and 
comparatively stable, in terms of social status, and the state, as represented by the political 
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